A Robust Rational Route to in a Simple Asset Pricing Model (revised March 2004) by Hommes, C.H. et al.
A Robust Rational Route to Randomness
in a Simple Asset Pricing Model∗
Cars Hommes
Department of Economics, CeNDEF
University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands
C.H.Hommes@uva.nl
Hai Huang Duo Wang
LMAM
School of Mathematics




We investigate asset pricing dynamics in an adaptive evolutionary asset pricing
model with fundamentalists, trend followers and a market maker. Agents can choose
between a fundamentalist strategy at positive information cost or choose a trend
following strategy for free. Price adjustment is proportional to the excess demand in
the asset market. Agents asynchronously update their strategy according to realized
net proﬁts in the recent past. As agents become more sensitive to diﬀerences in
strategy performance, the fundamental steady state becomes unstable and multiple
steady states may arise. As the traders’ sensitivity to diﬀerences in ﬁtness increases,
a bifurcation route to chaos sets in due to homoclinic bifurcations of stable and
unstable manifolds of the fundamental steady state.
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11 Introduction
Agent based evolutionary modeling of ﬁnancial markets is becoming increasingly popular.
Recent work on heterogeneous agent modelling includes, for example, the computational
oriented work on the Santa Fe artiﬁcial stock market by Arthur et al. (1997) and LeBaron
et al. (1999), the stochastic multi-agent models of Lux and Marchesi (1999, 2000) and
the evolutionary markets based on out-of-equilibrium price formation rules by Farmer
and Joshi (2002). An early example of a heterogeneous agents ﬁnancial market model
is Zeeman (1974); other examples include Frankel and Froot (1988), Kirman (1991),
Chiarella (1992), Brock (1993, 1997), Lux (1995), Gaunersdorfer (2000) and Westerhoﬀ
(2003). See e.g. LeBaron (2000) for a good recent survey of the literature.
Much of the interacting agents work is computationally oriented and the simulations
suggest a rich possibility of complicated asset price ﬂuctuations ranging from stable close
to the fundamental price ﬂuctuations to persistent deviations from the fundamental and
irregular, seemingly unpredictable asset price ﬂuctuations. Brock and Hommes (1997)
have proposed a simple evolutionary framework for endogenous strategy selection, based
upon the well known discrete choice model. The key feature of these systems is that
strategies that have performed well, as measured e.g. by realized proﬁts in the recent
past, attract more followers. Brock and Hommes (1998), henceforth BH, apply this
evolutionary framework to a standard asset pricing equilibrium model where investors
can either buy a risk free asset paying a ﬁxed return or invest in a risky asset paying
an uncertain dividend. One of their main ﬁndings is that as the intensity of choice,
measuring the sensitivity of traders to diﬀerences in strategy performance, increases
the fundamental steady state becomes unstable and bifurcations routes to periodic and
even chaotic asset price ﬂuctuations occur with irregular switching between close to the
fundamental steady state price ﬂuctuations and temporary speculative bubbles. BH
consider an equilibrium asset pricing model, where in each period a Walrasian auctioneer
sets the market equilibrium price such that total demand equals total supply.
An important question is how stability is related to the market institution. In this
paper we study a simple 2-type example with fundamentalists versus trend followers in
a diﬀerent market institution. Instead of a Walrasian market equilibrium price scenario,
we consider a market maker scenario, with a simple price adjustment process where in
each period the price change is proportional to the excess demand in the market. The
remaining stocks that are in excess demand (supply) will be supplied out of (added to)
the inventory of a market maker. Financial market heterogeneous agent models with
market makers have also been considered e.g. by Day and Huang (1994), Lux (1995),
Chiarella et al. (2002) and Chiarella and He (2002).
A second important extension is that we allow for asynchronous updating of beliefs
or strategies, whereas BH considered synchronous updating of beliefs with all agents
updating beliefs in each period. BH have shown that under synchronous updating, com-
plicated chaotic asset price ﬂuctuations can arise. To illustrate the importance of the
role of synchronous/asynchronous updating of beliefs, let us recall a classic discussion of
the results of Nowak and May (1992). The paper of Nowak and May (1992) presents
numerical simulations of prisoner’s dilemma games in a spatial context and shows that
chaotic behaviour occurs. However, Huberman and Glance (1993) stressed that if the
2cells on the lattice were updated not synchronously as usually in cellular automata, but
asynchronously —picking a player randomly and replacing it with the best player in a
neighbourhood— chaos disappears and the evolution leads to victory of the defectors and
no survival of the cooperators. Similar results were obtained in Mukherij et al. (1995).
Nowak et al. (1994) however showed that this eﬀect was only valid for a limited part of
the parameter space. This discussion shows the importance of investigating evolutionary
asset pricing models with asynchronous updating of beliefs. In our model updating of
beliefs is asynchronous, since only a (ﬁxed) fraction of the community of traders updates
their strategies in each period.
A third diﬀerence with BH is that we consider the possibility of a positive supply of
outside shares of the risky asset. This means that, in equilibrium traders require a positive
risk premium to hold all risky shares. The risk premium aﬀects the ﬁtness measure, and
thus aﬀects the evolutionary updating of fractions. We investigate in particular how this
risk premium aﬀects the stability of the fundamental steady state and global asset pricing
ﬂuctuations.
Despite these important diﬀerences compared to the BH-model, the global picture
of asset price dynamics is surprisingly similar as in BH. In particular, we show that a
rational route to randomness, that is, a bifurcation route to strange attractors occurs
when the intensity of choice to switch strategies increases. Our results show that many
global dynamic features are robust with respect to details of modelling market institu-
tion and evolutionary strategy switching. The mathematical mechanism explaining this
bifurcation route is a homoclinic bifurcation between the stable and unstable manifold of
the saddle point fundamental steady state. Due to our simple price adjustment rule the
model reduces to a 2-D system, and the homoclinic bifurcation between the stable and
unstable manifolds of the fundamental steady state can be nicely illustrated in the 2-D
phase space, and becomes intuitively plausible. Other economic applications of homo-
clinic bifurcation theory include De Vilder (1996), Pintus, Sands and De Vilder (2000),
Goeree and Hommes (2000), Yokoo (2000) and Droste, Hommes and Tuinstra (2002).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. In section 3 we
investigate local stability and bifurcations of the fundamental steady state. Section 4
focusses on global dynamics and section 5 concludes. All proofs are contained in an
appendix.
2 The Model
The initial part of the presentation of the model follows the asset pricing equilibrium
model with heterogeneous beliefs in BH, but then deviates by replacing the Walrasian
market clearing equilibrium price scenario by a market maker scenario as used in Chiarella
et al.(2002) and Chiarella and He (2002); see also Brock (1997) and Hommes (2001) for
more extensive discussions of the equilibrium model.
Agents can invest in a risk free asset or in a risky asset. The risk-free asset is perfectly
elastically supplied at a gross return R>1. pt denotes the price (ex-dividend) of the
risky asset and yt the (stochastic) dividend process. Tomorrow’s wealth of trader type h
is described by
3Wh,t+1 = RWht +( pt+1 + yt+1 − Rpt)zht, (1)
where zht is the number of shares of the risky asset purchased at time t by trader type h.
Let Eht, Vht be the beliefs or forecasts of trader type h about the conditional expectation
and conditional variance of tomorrow’s wealth, based upon a publicly available informa-
tion set consisting of past prices and dividends. Assuming that the investors are myopic





where a>0 denotes the risk aversion assumed to be equal and constant for all investors.
The demand zht for risky assets by trader type h is then given by
zht =
Eht(pt+1 + yt+1 − Rpt)
aVht(pt+1 + yt+1 − Rpt)
=
Eht(pt+1 + yt+1 − Rpt)
aσ2 , (3)
where we have assumed that beliefs about conditional variances of the excess returns
are the same for all investors and constant over time, i.e. Vht ≡ σ2.
At this point, let us brieﬂy discuss a world where all investors are identical and
expectations are homogeneous. Equilibrium of demand and supply implies
Eht(pt+1 + yt+1 − Rpt)
aσ2 = zs, (4)
where zs denotes the supply of shares per investor in the market, assumed to be ﬁxed
and constant over time. The market equilibrium equation can be rewritten as
Rpt = Et(pt+1 + yt+1) − aσ2zs. (5)
The quantity aσ2zs may be interpreted as the risk premium investors require for holding
all risky assets. It is well known that using the market equilibrium equation repeatedly




Rk = 0 (6)








t is called the fundamental rational expectations (RE) price or the funda-
mental price for short. The fundamental price is completely determined by economic
fundamentals and given by the discounted sum of expected future dividends adjusted by
the risk premium. Assuming that dividends are independently and identically distributed





¯ y − aσ2zs
Rk =
¯ y − aσ2zs
R − 1
. (8)
4As in Chiarella et al.(2002) and Chiarella and He (2002), we assume that there are
three classes of traders in the asset market: two groups of speculators - fundamentalists
and trend followers - and a market maker. Both fundamentalists and trend followers
have correct expectations on dividends, and thus forecast Eht(yt+1)=Et(yt)=¯ y. Ex-





t)=p∗ + g(pt − p∗),g > 0. (10)
At the beginning of period t, after observing the price pt, the demand zht (h =1 ,2)
for the risky asset by fundamentalists and trend followers is obtained by substituting
the common dividend forecast ¯ y and the forecasts (9) and (10) into the general demand




nhtzht − zs, (11)
where nht is the fraction of investors of type h =1 ,2. The role of the market maker is
to provide liquidity. When excess demand is positive, the market maker sells shares out
of his inventory at the going market price to clear the market; when excess demand is
negative, the market maker buys those shares at the going market price and adds them
to his inventory. The market maker buys from the investors when prices are high and
sell when prices are low. The investors, both fundamentalists and technical analysts, are
assumed to pay a fee to the market maker for providing liquidity and maintaining the
market institution. At the end of period t, after all transactions have been carried out,
the market price adjusts proportional to the observed excess demand. To be precise,
pt+1 = pt + µze,t (12)
with the parameter µ>0 denoting the correspondiong speed of adjustment. This stylized
price adjustment rule captures the key feature of “the law of demand and supply”, namely
that prices rise when there is excess demand and prices fall when there is excess demand.
The same price adjustment rule has been used recently by Chiarella et al.(2002) and
Chiarella and He (2002), who argue that it provides a stylized behavioural rule of the
market maker’s role of market-clearing and price-impact. Day and Huang (1990), Lux
(1995), Lux and Marchesi (2000) and Farmer and Joshi (2002) have used similar price
adjustment rules in ﬁnancial market models, where price changes are based upon excess
demand or upon changes in (excess) demand. A similar price adjustment rule is also used
in the well-known tˆ atonnement process, in continuous time e.g. by Arrow et al.(1959),
Scarf (1960) and Arrow and Hahn (1971), and in discrete time e.g. by Saari (1985),
Bala and Majumdar (1992), Day and Pianigiani (1991), Weddepohl (1995), Goeree et
al. (1998) and Tuinstra (1999, 2000). In our asset pricing setting, an advantage of the
simple price adjustment rule (12) is that the model remains analytically tractible and
reduces to a 2-dimensional system.
Finally, the evolutionary part of the model describes how beliefs are updated over
time, that is, how the fractions nht evolve over time. Traders are boundedly rational and
5tend to choose the strategy that has performed well in the recent past. The updated
fractions are formed on the basis of discrete choice probabilities, that is,







The parameter α,0≤ α ≤ 1 is the fraction of traders that sticks to its previous strategy,
whereas a fraction 1 − α updates their strategy according to their ﬁtness Uht. In the
extreme case α = 1, agents never update their beliefs; the other extreme case α =0
corresponds to synchronous updating of beliefs, where all agents update beliefs in each
period. The general case 0 <α<1 corresponds to asynchronous updating of beliefs.
The parameter β ≥ 0 is the intensity of choice measuring how sensitive agents are with
respect to diﬀerences in the ﬁtness of the prediction strategies. In the extreme case β =0
the traders are insensitive to diﬀerences in ﬁtness and both fractions converge to 1/2. In
the other extreme case, β = ∞, in each period a fraction 1 − α of the traders switches
to the strategy that has highest ﬁtness. Ch ≥ 0 represents the average costs per period
incurred by the investors of type h. The general idea is that more sophisticated strategies
require higher costs, e.g. due to information gathering. In what follows we will assume
that the costs for fundamentalists are higher than the costs for trend followers. Finally,
Uht is the ﬁtness measure of trading strategy h, which is deﬁned as a weighted average
of the realized proﬁts of trader type h, that is,
Uht =( pt+1 + yt+1 − Rpt)zht + wUh,t−1, (14)
where w is a weight parameter. In general, evolutionary ﬁtness is thus a weighted average
of realized proﬁts with exponentially declining weights. For analytical tractability we will
focus on the case w = 0, where ﬁtness is the most recently observed realized proﬁt.
Let us now summarize the complete evolutionary adaptive belief system:
pt+1 = pt + µ(n1tz1t + n2tz2t − zs), (15)










p∗ +¯ y − Rpt
aσ2 , (18)
z2t =
p∗ + g(pt − p∗)+¯ y − Rpt
aσ2 , (19)
Zt = eβ((pt+1+yt+1−Rpt)z1t−C1) + eβ((pt+1+yt+1−Rpt)z2t−C2). (20)
The main diﬀerences with the adaptive belief systems of BH are thus that we have a
market maker scenario with a price adjustment rule based upon excess demand, instead
of a Walrasian equilibrium, and we have asynchronous updating of strategies instead of
6synchronous updating. In what follows it will be convenient to work in deviations from
the benchmark fundamental price. Let
xt = pt − p∗, (21)
that is, xt is the deviation of the price from its fundamental value. Furthermore let
mt = n1t − n2t, (22)
that is, mt is the diﬀerence in fractions. A straightforward computation shows that the





2aσ2(1 − mt))xt, (23)











− gzsxt − C −
g
aσ2xt￿t+1)], (24)
with ￿t+1 = yt+1−¯ y the noise term on dividends and C = C1−C2 > 0, that is, per period
information gathering costs for fundamentalists are higher than for chartists. Notice that
the supply of outside shares zs aﬀects the fundamental price p∗ in (8) and therefore shows
up in the realizations of proﬁts of trader types, and thus aﬀects the diﬀerence in fractions
in (24). We are thus able to study the eﬀect of the risk premium upon the evolutionary
dynamics by considering positive supply of outside shares, zs > 0.
We will refer to the case without noise, i.e. ￿t+1 ≡ 0, as the deterministic skeleton
and study its stability and bifurcations in detail.1 From a mathematical viewpoint, the



































aσ2(R − v(m))x2 − gzsx − C). (29)
1In order to understand the properties of a stochastic model, it is important to understand the prop-
erties of the deterministic skeleton; see e.g. Tong (1990). The eﬀect of the stochastic factors on the
evolutionary competition will be investigated in future work.
73 Local Stability and Bifurcations
In this section we investigate the local stability and bifurcations of steady states for
0 ≤ α<1, i.e. we exclude the case α = 1, where fractions never change. Without loss
of generality, we can normalize aσ2 =1 . 2 To simplify the discussion and presentation
of the results below, we will focus on gross return of the risk-free asset in the plausible
range 1 <R<1.2.
It should be clear that for any β ≥ 0, E =( 0 ,−tanh(
βC
2 )) is a steady state of the
system. Obviously when x = 0 (or equivalently p = p∗), the price is at its benchmark
fundamental value, and we will therefore refer to E as the fundamental steady state.
Notice that when C>0, E moves from (0,0) to (0,−1) along the m-axes as β goes
from 0 to ∞. This is due to the fact that at the fundamental steady state both the
fundamental and the trend following strategy yield the same forecast. There is no point
in paying any cost in a steady state for a trading strategy that yields no extra proﬁt, so
the fraction of the cheap trend following strategy increases as the intensity of choice β
increases. In order to compare our results directly to the Walrasian senario of BH, we
ﬁrst study the stability of the fundamental steady state E when the supply of outside
shares is zero, i.e. when zs = 0. All proofs of propositions are given in the Appendix.
Proposition 1. (Stability & bifurcations of fundamental steady state for zs = 0; see ﬁg-
ure 1) Let βpd = 2
Ctanh−1(2R
g −1− 4
µg), β∗ = 2
Ctanh−1(2R
g −1) and let E =( 0 ,−tanh(
βC
2 ))
be the fundamental steady state. We have:
1. For 0 <g<R(see Figure 1a):
(i)0 <µ< 2
R: E is globally stable for all β ≥ 0;
(ii) 2
R <µ< 4
2R−g: E is locally stable, but not globally stable for all β>0
(for µ = 2
R a two-cycle is born at inﬁnity);
(iii) 4
2R−g <µ< 2
R−g: E is unstable for 0 ≤ β<β pd and locally stable for β>β pd;
E undergoes a (subcritical) period-doubling bifurcation at β = βpd;
(iv) µ> 2
R−g: E is unstable for all β ≥ 0.
2. For R<g<2R (see Figure 1b):
(i)0 <µ< 2
R: E is globally stable for 0 ≤ β<β ∗ and unstable for β>β ∗;
E undergoes a (supercritical) pitchfork bifurcation at β = β∗;
(ii) 2
R <µ< 4
2R−g: E is locally stable for 0 <β<β ∗ and unstable for β>β ∗;
E undergoes a (supercritical) pitchfork bifurcation at β = β∗;
(iii) µ> 4
2R−g: E is unstable for 0 ≤ β<β pd, locally stable for βpd <β<β ∗, and
unstable for β>β ∗; E undergoes a (subcritical) period-doubling bifurcation at
β = βpd and a (supercritical) pitchfork bifurcation at β = β∗.
3. For g>2R:


























Figure 1: Stability and bifurcations of the fundamental steady state in the (β,µ) plane. The
curve indicated by βpd is the subcritical period doubling bifurcation curve. The horizontal line at
µ =2 /R corresponds to the creation of a 2-cycle at inﬁnity. The vertical line β = β ∗ corresponds
to the supercritical pitchfork bifurcation in which two stable non-fundamental steady states are
created.
The stability of the fundamental steady state is determined jointly by the price adjust
speed µ, the intensity of choice β and the trend extrapolation parameter g. We compare
the above result with Lemma 2 in BH (p.1249) under the Walrasian equilibrium scenario.
Under the Walrasian scenario, in the case of weak trend extrapolation (0 <g<R ) the
fundamental steady state is always globally stable. Under the market maker scenario
the situation is more complex and depends upon the speed of adjustment µ. For small
price adjustment speed (0 <µ< 2
R) the fundamental steady state is globally stable.
For larger adjustment speed µ> 2
R, the fundamental steady state is not globally stable,
due to the fact that there exists a 2-cycle, which is created at inﬁnity for µ = 2
R. This
feature may be seen as an artifact of the price adjustment rule. For large adjustment
speeds strong overshooting can occur leading to exploding, large amplitude up and down
price ﬂuctuations and an (unstable) 2-cycle far away from the fundamental steady state.
From now on, we will therefore mainly focus on the case of ‘small’ price adjustment speed
(0 <µ< 2
R) and ignore this extreme form of overshooting.
In the case of very strong trend extrapolation (g>2R), both for the Walrasian
scenario and the market maker scenario, the fundamental steady state is always unstable
for all values of the adjust speed of price µ and the intensity of choice β. The most
interesting case occurs for a strong trend extrapolation parameter (R<g<2R): in
both the Walrasian scenario and the market maker scenario the fundamental steady
state becomes unstable through a supercritical pitchfork bifurcation. The following result
shows that two non-fundamental steady states are created in this pitchfork bifurcation
and discusses their stability:
Proposition 2. (Stability & bifurcation of non-fundamental steady states for zs =0 ;
see Figure 2a)
For R<g<2R and 0 <µ< 2






g(R−1) , βNS = 2
Ctanh−1(2R
g −1)+
2For the general case, one may use the transformation
µ
aσ2 7−→ ˜ µ,
β
aσ2 7−→ ˜ β, aσ
2zs 7−→ ˜ zs, aσ
2C 7−→




1. For 0 ≤ β<β ∗ the fundamental steady state E =( 0 ,−tanh(
βC
2 )) is the unique
steady state;
2. For β>β ∗ there exist two non-fundamental steady states Er =( xr,1 − 2R
g ) with
xr = x∗ and El =( xl,1 − 2R
g ) with xl = −x∗; moreover
(i) Er and El are locally stable for β∗ <β<β NS and unstable for β>β NS;
(ii) both Er and El undergo a supercritical Neimark-Sacker bifurcation at β = βNS
for α<0.6.
Immediately after the supercritical pitchfork bifurcation the two non-fundamental steady
states Er and El are locally stable. As the intensity of choice further increases these non-
fundamental steady states become unstable due to a supercritical Neimark-Sacker bifur-
cation in which two attracting invariant circles are created with periodic or quasi-periodic
dynamics.3 Although the numerical bifurcation values are diﬀerent, qualitatively this bi-
furcation scenario corresponds exactly to the bifurcation scenario under the Walrasian
equilibrium setting as in BH (Lemma 3, p. 1249).
For zs = 0 the system is symmetric with respect to the m-axis (x = 0) and the
Neimark-Sacker bifurcation of the symmetric non-fundamental steady states Er and El
occur for the same parameter β = βNS.F o rzs > 0 the system is not symmetric anymore,
and zs is thus a symmetry breaking parameter of the system. We have the following result:
Proposition 3. (Stability & bifurcations of fundamental/non-fundamental steady states
for zs > 0; see ﬁgure 2) For R<g<2R and 0 <µ< 2

























(i)0 ≤ β<β sn: the fundamental steady state E =( 0 ,−tanh(
βC
2 )) is globally stable;
(ii) β = βsn: a saddle-node bifurcation occurs and there is exactly one non-fundamental
steady state;
(iii) βsn <β<β ∗: E is locally stable and there are two non-fundamental steady states
Er =( xr,1 − 2R
g ) and El =( xl,1 − 2R
g ) with 0 <x l <x r;
(iv) β = β∗: a transcritical bifurcation occurs and the non-fundamental steady state El
coincides with the fundamental steady state E;
(v) β>β ∗: E is unstable and there are two non-fundamental steady states Er =
(xr,1 − 2R
g ) and El =( xl,1 − 2R
g ) with xl < 0 <x r.
Moreover, when zs is positive but small, there exists βr >β sn and βl >β ∗ such that
(vi) Er is locally stable for βsn <β<β r and unstable for β>β r; a supercritical
Neimark-Sacker bifurcation occurs at β = βr for α<0.6;
(vii) El is unstable for βsn <β<β ∗, locally stable for β∗ <β<β l and unstable
for β>β l; a transcritical bifurcation occurs at β = β∗, for which xl =0 , and a











(b) zs > 0
Figure 2: Bifurcation diagrams of (a) the symmetric case zs = 0 and (b) the asymmetric case
zs > 0.

















(b) zs =0 .01
Figure 3: Supercritical Neimark-Sacker bifurcation for R =1 .1,g=1 .15,µ=1 .6,α=0 .5,C=1 ,
(a) the symmetric case: βNS ≈ 4.18006, (b) the asymmetric case: βr ≈ 4.11408,β l ≈ 4.24672.
Proposition 3 is illustrated in ﬁgure 2. For zs = 0 the bifurcation diagram is symmetric
with respect to x = 0. Symmetry breaking occurs for zs > 0, and the non-generic
pitchfork bifurcation is replaced by the generic co-dimension-1 saddle-node bifurcation
and a transcritical bifurcation. Since for zs =0 ,Er and El will undergo supercritical
Neimark-Sacker bifurcation as β increases, we know that for small zs > 0, Er and El
will also undergo supercritical Neimark-Sacker bifurcation as β increases because the
occurence of the Neimark-Sacker bifurcation is a persistent property. Thus there also exist
two attracting invariant circles after the supercritical Neimark-Sacker bifurcations in the
asymmetric case. Moreover, from the explicit expressions for βr and βl (see Appendix)
it follows that βr <β NS <β l. So in the asymmetric case, the two Neimark-Sacker
bifurcations of Er and El do not occur simultaneously, as illustrated in ﬁgure 3.
4 Global Dynamics
This section discusses the global dynamical behaviour of the asset pricing model with fun-
damentalists and trend followers. We start with some numerical simulations in Subsection
3For the system with strong asynchronous updating of beliefs, i.e. large α, the Neimark-Sacker bifur-
cation becomes subcritical. We will restrict the analysis to α<0.6 and compare the results to the case
of synchronous updating (i.e. α = 0). The other cases are left for future work.
114.1. Subsection 4.2 discusses the stable and the unstable manifolds of the fundamental
steady state, which play a key role in understanding the global dynamics. Complicated
dynamics and strange attractors are discussed in Subsection 4.3.
4.1 Numerical Simulations
We investigate the global dynamical behaviour as the intensity of choice β becomes larger.
In all simulations the other parameters are ﬁxed at
R =1 .1,g=1 .15,µ=1 .6,α=0 .5,C=1 ,a σ 2 = 1 and zs =0 .01.
We emphasize that for other choices of the parameter values the results are similar.
We have chosen these particular values for various reasons, in particular for analytical
tractibility and expositionary purposes. Let us brieﬂy discuss each parameter separately:
• R =1 .1. We have chosen R =1 .1 in order to compare the market maker scenario
directly to the Walrasian scenario studied in BH 1998, who also used R =1 .1.
When the model is viewed on a daily time scale, the value of R is very close to 1.
In any case R>1, since otherwise the risky asset does not have a ﬁnite fundamental
price p∗ =¯ y/(R − 1). For R>1, and very close to 1, the results are similar but
the corresponding ﬁgures illustrating the route to complicated dynamics are less
clear and harder to read. From a didactical viewpoint, R =1 .1 yields better graphs
explaining and illustrating the typical bifurcation route to complicated dynamics;
• g =1 .15. This trend parameter g satisﬁes the inequality R<g<R 2 of proposition
4 below. For this range of g-values the same analysis applies. The lower bound
g>Rimplies that trend followers believe that asset prices grow faster than at
the rate of the risk free asset, ensuring that the fundamental steady state becomes
unstable for large intensity of choice β. The upper bound g<R 2 ensures that
the dynamics remains bounded. Without this upper bound, the system may lock
into a self-fulﬁlling bubble solution with trend followers earning higher proﬁts and
the asset price diverging to inﬁnity. One could extend the model, and allow for
larger g-values, by introducing some ‘stabilizing force’ to prevent asset pricing from
diverging to plus inﬁnity (see e.g. De Grauwe et al. (1993)). Such an additional,
stabilizing force would create an additional nonlinearity and make the analysis more
complicated. We conjecture that such an extended model yields similar dynamical
behaviour for g>R 2 also, but an analysis is beyond the scope of the current paper;
• µ =1 .6. The parameter µ is the speed of adjustment at which the market maker
adjusts asset prices, and thus reﬂects the market micro structure. The model
represents a stylized price adjustment process, satisfying the law of demand and
supply, but it is diﬃcult to say exactly what a reasonable value of µ is. It should be
emphasized however, that similar results hold for a range of µ-values. We focus on
the case 1/ R<µ<2/R which is analytically most tractible, and where a rational
route to randomness will be explained by a homoclinic bifurcation between the
stable and unstable manifolds of the fundamental steady state. Similar bifurcation
routes to complicated dynamics have also been observed numerically for 0 ≤ µ ≤
121/R. We conjecture that in that case a rational route to randomness occurs due
to homoclinic bifurcations between the stable and unstable manifolds of periodic
saddle points, but a detailed analysis is beyond the scope of this paper;
• α =0 .5. This parameter reﬂects the speed of asynchronous updating. For α =0 .5,
50% of all agents updates their strategy each period. Note that α is an eigenvalue
of the Jacobian matrix of the steady state, characterizing the speed of convergence
in periods where prices move towards the fundamental value. For 0 ≤ α<0.6 the
same analysis applies (see footnote 3 for the upperbound α =0 .6).
• C = 1. Costs for fundamentalists have been normalized to 1.
• aσ2 = 1. This is just a normalization, see footnote 2.
• zs =0 .01. This parameter represents the outside supply of shares per trader. When
the number of traders is large, zs should be small. This parameter plays a role in
the symmetry breaking of the system.




























Figure 4: Bifurcation diagram and Lyapunov exponent for (a) an initial state near the negative
non-fundamental steady state El, and (b) an initial state near the positive non-fundamental
steady state Er.
Figure 4 shows bifurcation diagrams and the corresponding Lyapunov Characteristic
Exponent(LCE) for increasing β,4 .0 ≤ β ≤ 5.0. In the left panel, the initial state is
near El, with x0 < 0, while in the right panel the initial state is near Er, with x0 > 0.
Figure 5 shows some typical time series of the price deviation x and Figure 6 shows the
corresponding attractors. The behaviour for 4.0 ≤ β ≤ 5.0 may be summarized as follows
(see ﬁgures 4, 5 and 6):
• for 4.0 ≤ β<4.11408 both non-fundamental steady states are locally stable;
for β ≈ 4.11408, the positive steady state Er undergoes a supercritical Neimark-
Sacker bifurcation;






































Figure 5: Time series for β =4 .3, 4.45, 4.6, for (a) negative (below the fundamental) initial
state (left panel), and (b) positive (above the fundamental) initial state (right panel).
• for 4.11408 <β<4.24672 the locally stable negative non-fundamental steady state
El coexists with a periodic or quasi-periodic attractor around the positive unstable
non-fundamental steady state Er;
for β ≈ 4.24672, the negative steady state Er undergoes a supercritical Neimark-
Sacker bifurcation;
• for 4.24672 <β<4.39288 both non-fundamental steady states are unstable. Two
attractors coexists, one (quasi-)periodic around the unstable negative steady state
El and one periodic or quasi-periodic attractor around the positive unstable steady
state Er; the latter attractor becomes chaotic, with positive Lyapunov exponent,
as β approaches 4.39288; for β ≈ 4.39288 the positive (chaotic) attractor suddenly
disappears;
• for 4.39288 <β<4.55327 there seems to be only one attractor, around the locally
unstable negative steady state El; this attractor is ﬁrst periodic or quasi-periodic,
but becomes chaotic, with positive Lyapunov exponent, as β approaches 4.55327;
for β ≈ 4.55327 the negative (chaotic) attractor suddenly disappears;
• for 4.55327 <β≤ 5.0 there seems to be only one attractor, with two branches,
one around the unstable negative steady state El and a second branch around the
unstable positive steady state Er; for many β values this attractor is chaotic, with
positive Lyapunov exponent.
An important feature of the model is the co-existence of diﬀerent attractors. In
particular, an attractor representing an optimistic state of the market, i.e. with price




























































Figure 6: Attractors for diﬀerent β-values: (a) β =4 .3: two co-existing (quasi-)periodic attrac-
tors; (b) β =4 .38: (quasi-)periodic attractor (left) coexists with chaotic attractor (right); (c)
β =4 .39288: chaotic attractor becomes ‘tangent’ to stable manifold (the vertical line x = 0) of
the fundamental steady state; (d)β =4 .4 single (quasi-)periodic attractor; (e) β =4 .55327: single
chaotic attractor becomes ‘tangent’ to stable manifold (the vertical line x = 0) of the fundamental
steady state, and (f) β =4 .65: chaotic attractor on both sides of fundamental steady state.
15ﬂuctuations above the fundamental value, can coexists with an attractor representing a
pessimistic state, i.e. with prices ﬂuctuating below their fundamental value. This feature
also occurs in the BH-model with a Walrasian market equilibrium scenario. However, in
contrast to the BH-framework, as the intensity of choice further increases our model with
a market maker exhibits endogenous switching between optimistic and pessimistic states,
as illustrated for example in the time series for β =4 .6 in ﬁgure 5. Under the Walrasion
equilibrium scenario switching between optimistic and pessimistic states only occurs due
to exogenous noise or after adding more trader types to the market. The market maker
institution thus leads more easily to switching between optimistic and pessimistic market
outcomes, even in a simple setting with fundamentalists versus trend followers.
4.2 The Stable and Unstable Manifolds
What causes the sudden disappearance of the attractors representing optimistic or pes-
simistic states of the market? It turns out that homoclinic bifurcations between the stable
and unstable manifold of the fundamental steady state play a key role in explaining the
endogenous switching between optimistic and pessimistic market states. For convenience
of the reader, we brieﬂy recall some basic notions.
Consider a diﬀerentiable two-dimensional map Ψβ : R2 → R2, where β ∈ R is a
parameter. Let p be a saddle ﬁxed with real eigenvalues λ1 and λ2 such that 0 < |λ2| <
1 < |λ1|. Moreover p is called dissipative if |λ1λ2| < 1. The local stable set or stable
manifold of the ﬁxed point p is
Ws
loc(p)={x ∈ U|Ψn(x) → p asn → +∞},
and the local unstable set or unstable manifold is
Wu
loc(p)={x ∈ U|Ψn(x) → p asn → −∞},
where U is some small neighborhood of p. The global stable set or stable manifold and










A point q 6= p is called a homoclinic point if q ∈ Wu(p)∩W s(p); moreover q is called
a transversal homoclinic point if Wu(p) and W s(p) intersect transversely at q, while q
is called a point of homoclinic tangency if Wu(p) and W s(p) intersect tangentially at q.
The notion of homoclinic orbit was introduced by Poincar´ e already more than a century
ago, who realized that existence of a homoclinic point implies complicated dynamical
behaviour.
In our model, the vertical m-axes, (p =0 , −1 ≤ m ≤ 1), belongs to the stable
manifold of the fundamental steady state E =( 0 ,−tanh(
βC
2 )). Since the horizontal line
m = m0, with m0 =1 − 2R
g + 2
µg, is mapped onto the m-axis, this horizontal line also lies in
the stable manifold of E. Figure 7 shows the unstable manifold of the fundamental steady
state for increasing values of the parameter β. The unstable manifold of the fundamental
steady state has two branches, one in the positive and one in the negative half plane,
spiralling around the non-fundamental steady states. Each region bounded by a branch
16of the unstable manifold yields an invariant region and the two co-existing attractors
are contained in these regions (see e.g. the upper panel in ﬁgure 7). For β ≈ 4.39288 a
ﬁrst homoclinic bifurcation occurs between the positive branch of the unstable manifold
and the stable manifold (see ﬁgure 7c and its enlargement in ﬁgure 7g). At this critical
homoclinic bifurcation value, the positive region still contains an attractor. After this
ﬁrst homoclinic bifurcation however, points escape from the positive half plane into the
negative half plane and converge to the negative attractor, as illustrated in ﬁgure 6d.
As β further increases, for β ≈ 4.55327, a second homoclinic tangency occurs, this time
between the left branch of the unstable manifold and the stable manifold, as illustrated
in ﬁgure 7e. At the homoclinic bifurcation value, the left region is still invariant and
contains an attractor below the fundamental price. For β>4.55327 both the left and the
right branch have transversal intersections with the stable manifold, and points now can
also escape from left to right. Both branches of the unstable manifold oscillate wildly,
as illustrated in ﬁgures 7f and its enlargement Figure 7h, and the attractor is neither
contained in the negative nor in the positive region, but rather lies in both regions. The
bifurcation route to endogenous switching between optimistic and pessimistic market
states is thus explained by homoclinic bifurcations of the stable and unstable manifolds
of the fundamental steady state.
4.3 Strange Attractors
The existence of transversal homoclinic orbits implies complicated dynamical behaviour
in the system, such as existence of the well known Smale horseshoe chaotic invariant sets.
Smale (1965) proved that, for a diﬀeomorphism Ψ with a transverse homoclinic point,
there exists a suitable integer k such that Ψk has invariant set Λ in the neigbourhood
of the homoclinic point, with inﬁnitely many periodic points and, an uncountable set of
aperiodic points as well as orbits which are dense in Λ. Moreover, the map Ψk restricted
to Λ exhibits sensitivity to initial states and therefore the dynamics is chaotic. See also
Palis and Takens (1993, esp. Chapter 2).4
For the system we are considering, the fundamental steady state E becomes a saddle
point after the pitchfork bifurcation in the symmetric case zs = 0 or after the transcritical
bifurcation in the asymmetric case zs > 0. Figures 7c and 7g show that, as the intensity
of choice β increases, a homoclinic bifurcation occurs, between the right respectively
the left branch of the unstable manifold W u(E) of and the stable manifold Ws(E)o f
the fundamental steady states. A number of complicated phenomena occur due to the
homoclinic bifurcation, such as existence of strange attractor, co-existence of inﬁnitely
many stable cycles and cascades of inﬁnitely many period doubling and period halving
bifurcations; see Palis and Takens (1993) for an extensive mathematical treatment. Here
we focus on existence of strange attractors. An important result is the following:
Strange Attractor Theorem ( see Mora and Viana (1993); see also Palis and Takens
(1993)) Let Fβ : R2 → R2 be a two-dimensional map with parameter β, and let p be a
dissipative saddle point. If the map Fβ exhibits a generic homoclinic bifurcation between
4Hale and Lin (1986) show that these properties are of a local nature and can be generalized to
endomorphism (i.e. non-invertible maps) with continuous diﬀerential. Gardini (1996) presents a case
study that the result may also hold for some endomorphism on the plane without continuous derivative.
















































































Figure 7: Unstable manifold of E for β =( a)4 .3, (b)4 .38, (c)4 .39288, (d)4 .4,
(e)4 .55327, (f)4 .65, (g)4 .39288in detail, (h)4 .65in detail. Homoclinic bifurcations between
the stable and unstable manifolds of the fundamental steady state occur for β ≈ 4.39288 (Figure
7c and its enlargement in 7g) and for β ≈ 4.55327 (Figure 7e).
18the stable manifold and the unstable manifold of the saddle point at β = βh, then there
exists a positive Lebesgue measure set Ω ⊂ (βh − ￿,βh + ￿), such that for all β ∈ Ω the
map Fβ has a strange attractor.
Roughly speaking the theorem states that close to a homoclinic bifurcation strange at-
tractors arise with positive probability in the parameter space.
Figures 7c and 7g already suggest that this result also holds for our model, in the
asymmetric case zs > 0. We state and prove (see the appendix) the result here only
for the symmetric case zs = 0, since the computations are considerably simpliﬁed in the
symmetric case; the main ideas underlying the proof suggest that similar results also hold
in the asymmetric case.5
Proposition 4. (Homoclinic bifurcation of fundamental steady state for zs =0 )






µg . Then the fundamental
steady state E is a dissipative saddle point for all β>β ∗ after the pitchfork bifurcation.
Moreover,
(i) for β>β ∗ with |β −β∗| small, there is no intersection between Wu(E) and Ws(E)
(the unstable manifold of E is attracted by Er and El);
(ii) for some βh >β ∗, a homoclinic bifurcation between the stable and unstable mani-
folds of E occurs;
(iii) for β>β h, there always exist transversal homoclinic orbits of E.
Corollary 4.1 (Existence of strange attractors) For the other parameters ﬁxed as in
proposition 4, there exists a positive Lebesgue measure set of β-values in the parameter
interval (βh − ￿,βh + ￿) for which the dynamic system generated by the map F has a
strange attractor.
Corollary 4.2 (Existence of chaotic orbits) For the other parameters ﬁxed as in propo-
sition 4 and β suﬃciently large, there exists an invariant Cantor set containing an un-
countable set of initial states with chaotic orbits.
According to corollary 4.2, when the intensity of choice is suﬃciently large, the model
has an invariang Cantor set with many chaotic orbits. Typically these chaotic orbits
have a saddle structure, and are thus unstable so that the long run dynamical behaviour
typically may still be regular. According to corrollary 4.1 however, strange attracors
occur in the model for a large set of β-values. One may interpret this result as saying
that strange attractors occur with positive probability in the parameter space.
5We restrict our analysis to the symmetric case zs = 0 and other parameter intervals as stated in the
proposition, which include e.g. our simulation benchmark R =1 .1,g=1 .15,µ=1 .6,α=0 .5. Homoclinic
bifurcations between the stable and unstable manifolds of the fundamental steady state occur for a much
wider range of parameter values, but the proof would require considering many diﬀerent detailed subcases
without gaining much insight. We therefore focus on the cases stated in the proposition. Furthermore,




µg, which is part of the stable
manifold of the fundamental steady state E, plays an important role. The reader may easily verify that
m0 < 1 if and only if µ>1/R.F o rµ>1/R a homoclinic bifurcation between the stable and unstable
manifolds of the fundamental steady state occur as the intensity of choice increases. Bifurcation routes
to complicated dynamics have also been observed numerically for 0 ≤ µ ≤ 1/R. We conjecture that
in that case a rational route to randomness occurs due to homoclinic bifurcations between the stable
and unstable manifolds of periodic saddle points, but a detailed analysis is much more complicated and
beyond the scope of this paper.
195 Conclusion
We have investigated an evolutionary asset pricing model with speculative traders, funda-
mentalists and technical analysts (trend followers), where agents tend to choose strategies
that have performed well, according to realized proﬁts, in the recent past. Our model
deviates in three important ways from the adaptive belief systems of Brock and Hommes
(1998). Firstly, intead of the Walrasian equilibrium price scenario, we considered a model
with a market maker and a simple price adjustment rule, where price changes are pro-
portional to excess demand. Secondly, we allow for asynchronous updating of strategies,
instead of synchronous updating of beliefs. In our framework, in each period only a
(ﬁxed) fraction of the traders updates their beliefs. A third extension of our model has
been that we have been considering the case of positive outside supply of shares. In that
case, the fundamental price is aﬀected by a risk premium, which also shows up in the
ﬁtness measure, and therefore aﬀects evolutionary dynamics.
Summarizing the results, one may say that despite three important changes in the
model, the dynamical behaviour is surprisingly similar to the BH dynamics. In partic-
ular, in a world where fundamentalist strategies are more costly than trend following
strategies, a rational route to randomness, that is, a bifurcation route to strange attrac-
tors, occurs as the sensitivity to switch strategies increases. Although some details of
this route may be diﬀerent, the global picture remains the same, with creation of two
non-fundamental steady states, Neimark-Sacker bifurcations of these non-fundamental
steady states, invariant circles around each of the non-fundamental steady states and
breaking of these invariant circles into a strange attractor. There is one diﬀerence in the
dynamical behaviour worthwhile mentioning. In contrast to the Walrasian market equi-
librium scenario, under a market maker scenario, in a world with costly fundamentalism
and free technical trading endogenous switching between “optimistic states” where the
market is overvalued and “pessimistic states” where the market is undervalued can occur
when the intensity of choice increases. The main conclusion from our analysis however
is that global dynamical features do not necessarily depend upon details of the market
institution model, and can be quite robust with respect to changes in the speciﬁcations
of the functional equations and modelling assumptions.
Appendix









with eigenvalues λ1 = v(−tanh(
βC
2 )) and λ2 = α. Since 0 ≤ α<1, the stability of E
dependends on λ1. Notice that −1 <λ 1 < 1 is equivalent to 2R





g − 1. Local stability of E may then be veriﬁed by direct calculation. Moreover, it is
clear that E is globally stable for 0 <g<Rand 0 <µ< 2
R. The global stability of E
for R<g<2R and 0 <µ< 2
R can be veriﬁed by noticing that points below the line
m =1− 2R
g will be mapped above this line in ﬁnite iterations and then will be attracted
by E.
20Let Cm be the locus of the points satisfying F2(x,m)=m, that is
Cm ={(x,m)| m = tanh(βw(x,m))}.
The birth of a two-cycle at inﬁnity for µ = 2
R and the period-doubling bifurcation at
β = βpd for µ> 4
2R−g can be veriﬁed by noticing that the points of the 2-cycle correspond
to the two intersection points of the line m =1− 2R
g + 4
µg and the curve Cm. By direct
calculation it can be shown that the 2-cycle created in the period-doubling bifurcation is
unstable.
Now consider the existence of non-fundamental steady state for R<g<2R and
0 <µ< 4
2R−g. It is clear that (x,m) with x 6= 0 is a non-fundamental steady state if and
only if (x,m) is an intersection point of the line m =1− 2R
g and Cm. Thus the result of
the pitchfork bifurcation at β = β∗ can be readily veriﬁed.
Proof of Proposition 2. Since the system is symmetric for zs = 0, we just focus on
the positive non-fundamental steady state Er. Notice that, with the other parameters






the line m =1− 2R










The trace and the determinant of Jr are
trJr =1+α +( 1− α)βµR(g − R)x2
r,
detJr = α +( 1− α)βµR(g − R)(2R − 1)x2
r.
The characteristic equation is
Q(λ)=λ2 − trJrλ + detJr =0 .
Let λ1 and λ2 be the eigenvalues. For β>β ∗ it follows from xr > 0 that λ1λ2 = detJr >
0, so λ1 and λ2 are on the same side of the complex plane. Since λ1 +λ2 =t r Jr > 1+α,
it is clear that λ1 and λ2 are both on the right side of the complex plane. For β = β∗,
λ1 = 1 and λ2 = α<1. Notice that Q(1) > 0 and
dQ(1)
dβ > 0 for all β>β ∗. Therefore





dβ > 0 for β>β ∗, and detJr →∞as β →∞ , there
exits a βNS >β ∗ such that Er is locally stable for β∗ <β<β NS and Er is unstable for
β>β NS.















g(R − 1) + 2tanh−1(2R
g − 1)µR(g − R)(2R − 1)
.
Moreover detJ0 = 1 and the characteristic equation is
λ2 − trJ0λ +1=0
21with trJ0 =
2R+2(R−1)α
2R−1 . So the eigenvalues are









with |λ1| = |λ2| = 1. It is clear that 0 <θ<π
3 and therefore λ1,2 satisﬁes the nonreso-
nance condition λ1,2 / ∈{ e
2πi
p





dβ > 0a tβ = βNS.
To verify that the Neimark-Sacker bifurcation is supercritical its normal form has to
be computed; see Kuznetsov (1998), especially section 4.7, for an extensive treatment of
bifurcation theory including the Neimark-Sacker bifurcation. First choose the eigenvector












while the adjoint eigenvector p, which satisﬁes J0




















x0 + q1z +¯ q1¯ z
1 − 2R
g + q2z +¯ q2¯ z
￿
and evaluate the function
H(z,¯ z)= ¯ p1(F1(x0 + q1z +¯ q1¯ z,1 −
2R
g
+ q2z +¯ q2¯ z) − x0)
+¯ p2(F2(x0 + q1z +¯ q1¯ z,1 −
2R
g










gjkzj¯ zk + O(|z|
4).
















for 1 <R<1.2, R<g<2R and 0 <α<0.6. This implies that a supercritical Neimark-
Sacker bifurcation occurs and a unique and stable closed invariant curve bifurcates from
Er for β>β NS.














with eigenvalues λ1 = v(−tanh(
βC
2 )) and λ2 = α. The local stability of E can be veriﬁed
by direct calculation. The global stability of E for 0 ≤ β<β sn can be veriﬁed by
22noticing that the points below the line m =1− 2R
g will be mapped above this line in
ﬁnite iterations and then will be attracted by E.
Notice that (x,m) with x 6= 0 is a non-fundamental steady state if and only if (x,m)
is a intersetction point of the line m =1− 2R
g and Cm. Thus the result of the saddle-node
bifurcation at β = βsn can be readily veriﬁed. If β increases from βsn to ∞, Er moves
from ( zs
2(R−1),1− 2R






g ) along the line m =1− 2R
g .








g R(R − 1)(g − R)(xr − zs




trJr =1+α +( 1− α)βµR(g − R)x2
r,
detJr = α +( 1− α)βµR(g − R)((2R − 1)x2
r − zsxr).
Let λ1 and λ2 be the eigenvalues of the characteristic equation
Q(λ)=λ2 − trJrλ + detJr =0 .
¿From xr > zs
2(R−1) it follows that λ1λ2 = detJr > 0, so λ1 and λ2 are on the same side
of the complex plane. Moreover, since λ1 + λ2 =t r Jr > 1+α, it is clear that λ1 and
λ2 are both on the right side of complex plane. For β = βsn, it can be veriﬁed by direct
computation that one of two eigenvalues of Er,s a yλ1 = 1; the other is λ2 = detJr.





s) < 1, it can be shown that λ2 < 1 for
β = βsn. Notice that Q(1) > 0 and
dQ(1)
dβ > 0 for β>β sn. Therefore 0 <λ 2 <λ 1 < 1




dβ > 0 for β>β sn, and detJr →∞as β →∞ , there exists a βr >β sn
such that Er is locally stable for βsn <β<β r and Er is unstable for β>β r.
Existence and stability of the negative steady state El can be discussed similarly.
When β increases from βsn to ∞, El moves along the line m =1 −2R









g ). For β = β∗, El coincides with the fundamental
steady state E at (0,1− 2R
g ). Moreover it can be veriﬁed that there exists a βl >β ∗ such
that El is unstable for βsn <β<β ∗, locally stable for β∗ <β<β l, and unstable for
β>β l. We notice that the explicit expresions for βr and βl are
βr =
2tanh−1(2R
g − 1)µR(g − R)(2R − 1) + g(R − 1)




g − 1)µR(g − R)(2R − 1) + g(R − 1)
µR(g − R)((2R − 1)C + gRzsxl)
,
with −x0 <x l < 0 <x 0 <x r, where x0 is the x-value of the non-fundamental steady
state corresponding to the Neimark-Sacker bifurcation in the symmetric case zs =0 .
Thus βr <β NS <β l. Since the normal form computations of the Neimark-Sacker
bifurcation depend continuously on the parameter zs it follows that Er and El also
undergo supercritical Neimark-Sacker bifurcation at β = βr and β = βl respectively.
23In particular, for R =1 .1, g =1 .15, µ =1 .6, α =0 .5, C = 1, a straightforward
computations shows that for zs =0a(βNS) ≈− 2.1591 for both Er and El, while for
zs =0 .01 a(βr) ≈− 2.15237 for Er and a(βl) ≈− 2.40127 for El.
Proof of Proposition 4. It can be readily veriﬁed that the fundamental steady state E
becomes a dissipative saddle ﬁxed point after the pitchfork bifurcation. In fact, the two
real eigenvalues of E are λ1(β)=v(−tanh(
βC
2 )) and λ2(β)=α. A simple computation
then shows that E will be a dissipative saddle ﬁxed point for all β>β ∗ if α< 1
1+µ(g−R).





























For R =1 .1,g=1 .15,µ=1 .6, the condition on α becomes 0 <α<0.64.
Notice that immediately after the pitchfork bifurcation, the unstable manifold of E
is attracted by Er and El. Since the second eigenvalue of E is 0 <λ 2 = α<1a t
β = β∗, the dynamical system near the pitchfork bifurcation can be reduced to the one
dimensional center manifold. At β = β∗ the two branches of W u(E) coincide with part
of the center manifold and connect E with Er and E with El. Thus for β>β ∗ with
|β − β∗| small, there is no intersection between Wu(E) and Ws(E).
Next we show the existence of transversal homoclinic orbits for suﬃciently large β.
In order to understand the properties of the unstable manifold of E for large β, it will
be useful to consider the limiting case β = ∞ ﬁrst; see Figure 8 for illustration. In the








αm +( 1− α), for w(x,m) > 0
αm, for w(x,m)=0
αm − (1 − α), for w(x,m) < 0.
Let Cr and Cl be the locus of points satisfying w(x,m) = 0 on the right and left part of
the plane respectively. Then Cr and Cl are












Notice that for β = ∞, the fundamental steady state is E =( 0 ,−1). For Cr, x(m)i sa
decreasing function of m and it follows from µ<R−1
g−R that Cr and the line m = −1 inter-
sect at the point P0 =(
√
C √
g(R−v(−1)),−1). The segment EP0 lies in the unstable manifold




g(R−v(−1)),−1). Then F∞(P−1)=P0. The ﬁrst iterate of seg-














g(R−v(−1)),1−2α). It is clear that for 0 <α<
µR−1
µg the segment P0
2P2 lies above the






2P2 lies between the
line m = m0 and m = m1 with m1 =1− 2R
g (see Figure 8b, case 2). Recall that the line
m = m0 belongs to the stable manifold of the fundamental steady state. In case 2 we con-









g(R−v(−1)) ,1 − 2α2), using the fact that P0
2P2 is outside the region
bounded by Cr and Cl. Clearly the segment P0
3P3 lies above the line m = m0.T o
understand the global geometric shape of the unstable manifold of E for large, but ﬁnite
β, it is useful to investigate the jumping segment P1P0
2 and its forward iterates. For
β large, but ﬁnite, the unstable manifold of E will be close to the unstable manifold in
the limiting case β = ∞. In the following we focus case 2 (Figures 8b-f); case 1 can be
discussed in a similar way. Notice that the iterate of the segment P1P0
2 under the map
F∞ just gives the segment P2P0
3. Simple computation shows that the segment P2P0
3
intersects with the line m = m0 (i.e. the stable manifold of the fundamental steady state)




α −1),m 0). For ﬁnite but large β, the unstable man-
ifold of E is close to the polyline PoP1P0
2P2P0
3P3 and hence also transversaly intersects
with the branch of the stable manifold m = m0 at some point Q near the point Q∞.
Thus we have shown the existence of a transveral homoclinic point between the stable
and the unstable manifolds of E for β suﬃciently large.
By continuity it then follows that there exists a critical value βh >β ∗ such that a
homoclinic bifurcation occurs at β = βh.
Proof of Corollary 4.1. In order to apply the strange attractor theorem, certain generic
conditions must be satisfyied. Takens(1992) presents three conditions for a generic system
of homoclinic bifurcation: (i) F is real analytic; (ii) the function h(β)=−
ln|λ1(β)|
ln|λ2(β)| is not
constant, and (iii) the homoclinic tangency is inevitable, that is the system moves from
a situation without any homoclinic points to the situation with transversal homoclinic
points. All three generic conditions are satisﬁed in our system.
Finally, we notice that the strange attractor theorem applies to (local) diﬀeomor-
phisms. It is suﬃcient to show that in the region where the homoclinic bifurcation
occurs the map F is (locally) a diﬀeomorphism. Let S = {(x,m)|−1 <m<m 0}, where
m = m0 is part of the stable manifold of the fundamental steady state, and S0 = F(S).
We claim that F : S → S0 is a diﬀeomorphism. In fact it can be veriﬁed by direct calcu-
lation that for any point p ∈ S the determinant of the Jacobian of the map F is positive.
Moreover, we claim that for any two points p, q ∈ S with p 6= q we have F(p) 6= F(q).
In fact, assume otherwise that p =( x1,m 1) 6= q =( x2,m 2) such that F(p)=F(q).
From F1(x1,m 1)=F1(x2,m 2) it follows that m1 6= m2 since p 6= q. But then it also
can be checked that m1 <m 2 implies F2(x1,m 1) <F 2(x2,m 2) while m1 >m 2 implies
F2(x1,m 1) >F 2(x2,m 2) under the condition µ<R−1
g−R. So this is a contradiction. Now
consider the region above the line m = m0.
Let J0 be the locus of points where the Jacobian determinant of map F vanish. Then
it can be veriﬁed that J0 is
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(a) β = ∞,α=0 .2 (case 1)






P 0 P -1 P 1 E
Cr
P 2 P ’
2
P 3 P ’
3
m=m0
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Figure 8: Unstable manifold of E for β = ∞vs.β = 200 with R =1 .1,g=1 .15,µ=1 .6,C =




(sech(βw(x,m)))2(2R − v(m))x2 =0 }.
It can be veriﬁed that J0 has three branches between m0 ≤ m ≤ 1, which are symmetric
with respect to the m-axes and are located strictly above the line m = m0 except the point
(0,m 0) on the line, as illustrated in Figure 9. It then follows that in a neighbourhood
where the homoclinic bifurcation occurs the map F is locally a diﬀeomorphism.




















Figure 9: Illustration of the curves J0, the stable and unstable manifold of E, near the homoclinic
bifurcation, for (a) β =4 .4724, and (b) β =4 .477, with the ohter parameters ﬁxed at R =1 .1,
g =1 .15, µ =1 .6, α =0 .5, C = 1 and zs =0 .
Proof of Corollary 4.2. We need to verify that for β large, the map F is a local
diﬀeomorphism close to the homoclinic orbit. We know from the proof of proposition 4
that, for suﬃciently large β there is a transversal homoclinic point Q. F maps the point
Q onto a point on the m-axes strictly below the line m = αm0 +(1−α), and the second




Notice that the only point of J0 (i.e. the set of poinst where the determinant of the
Jacobian matrix of F vanishes) is (0,m 0). Moreover when β tends to ∞ J0 moves close to
the line m = m0 and the part of the curves Cr and Cl between the line m = m0 and m =1 .
It can be veriﬁed that except for at most one value of α (for which F∞(Q∞)=( 0 ,m 0))
F is locally invertible in the neighborhood of every point in the homoclinic orbit passing
through Q, and therefore the unstable manifold intersect the stable manifold transversally
at each point of the homoclinic orbit. Hence, we can apply the result of Hale and Lin
(1986), implying the existence of chaotic orbits in the system for large β due to the
existence of the transverse homoclinic orbits.
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